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We propose and demonstrate a novel protocol for reference frame independent quantum key distribution
using six states for Alice and four states for Bob. We show that this protocol can generate a secure key for
any possible phase of the entangled state, as long as the variation is small compared to the measurement run,
despite the reduced four state measurement in Bob’s polarization state analyzer. We perform a proof-of-principle
experiment using polarization entangled photon pairs. Despite a rotational phase, we obtain a consistently low
error rate of less than 3% indicating the feasibility of this protocol for quantum key distribution. Our protocol is
beneficial but not limited to applications in satellite or mobile free-space QKD, where the remote communication
node must limit resources and restrict the number of measured states to four instead of six.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols provide a
means of generating and sharing an encryption key between
two parties, Alice and Bob, with the security guaranteed by
the laws of quantum physics [1]. There is an on-going ef-
fort to improve the practicality and robustness of QKD [1]. In
many protocols, both Alice and Bob need continuous agree-
ment of all shared measurement frames during the entire pe-
riod of communication [2–4]. The definition of the measure-
ment frames is essential for key generation, for instance pro-
tocols that utilize polarization encoding, a geometric refer-
ence is required. However, this demand can be relaxed by
employing reference frame independent (RFI) protocols, that
allows all or some of the measurement frames to freely to ro-
tate by some slowly varying relative phase φ [5–7]. RFI pro-
tocols are useful in many settings such as free-space satellite
links where the frames of reference may not be maintained
due to rotations of the satellite[5].We present and implement
a RFI protocol, using polarization entangled photons, where
one receiver (Bob) can only perform measurements in two
Pauli bases, while the other receiver (Alice) can measure in
the usual three Pauli bases, the 6-4 state protocol. Despite the
reduced measurement at Bob, we demonstrate that the proto-
col is still RFI and suitable for QKD.
We experimentally demonstrate the viability of the 6-4 pro-
tocol by compensating for the polarization rotations present
in optical fibers due to manufacturing tolerances, and ther-
mal and mechanical stress. These rotations are indeed a major
challenge for many photonic applications, and one of the ma-
jor reasons that polarization qubits are rarely used in optical
fiber-based quantum channels. Methods to mitigate the rota-
tions caused in optical fibers typically require the isolation and
stabilization of the fiber, or the use of active optics to compen-
sate for polarization fluctuations[8]. Polarization maintaining
fibers (PMF) were developed to specifically combat these ro-
tations [9], however any polarization not aligned to one of the
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TABLE I: Polarization basis with the corresponding Pauli
spin matrix and the symbols used in this work.
Basis Pauli Spin Operator Symbol
H/V σz Z
D/A σx X
R/L σy Y
two axes (slow or fast axis) will be subject to a large birefrin-
gent phase, which will typically cause entangled photons to
decohere. However, by using our RFI protocol, one can still
use PMF for quantum information purposes despite the large
birefringent phase that is induced to superposition bases, (i.e.
linear combinations of the slow and fast axis polarizations).
A. Protocol
For the 6-4 RFI QKD protocol, we modify the scheme pre-
sented by Laing et al.[5] to account for the reduced measure-
ment on Bob’s qubit. Alice and Bob share an entangled state
ρAB, each making Pauli measurements on half of the two-qubit
state. In our case, the computational basis is the horizontal-
vertical polarization basis (Z) which in turn is the fixed basis.
Alice applies a 6 state measurement on her qubit, measuring
in the Pauli Z,X , and Y bases, while Bob applies a 4 state
measurement on his qubit in the Pauli Z,and X bases. Here
the Pauli Matrices corresponds to the polarization basis as in
Table I.
The reduced measurement at the receiver (Bob) brings sev-
eral benefits. Most importantly, it reduces the resources re-
quired for Bob’s state analyzer, which is important for re-
ceivers that are constrained by resources such as on satellites
like the Quantum Encryption Science Satellite [10] or mobile
devices. The omission of the third basis in Bob requires ad-
justing the parameters used in the symmetric 6 state protocol
presented in Laing et al. [5].
We therefore define a phase independent parameter (C-
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2parameter)
C =
√
〈XAXB〉2 + 〈YAXB〉2, (1)
where 〈M〉 is the expectation value of the two qubit positive-
operator valued measure (POVM) M, defined as,
〈M〉= M++−M+−−M−++M−−
∑i jMi j
. (2)
Mi j (i, j = +,−) are the coincidence counts of the various
results for the POVM M and ∑i jMi j is the total coincidence
counts measured of M. By Pauli algebra, we see that C ≤ 1,
with the equality occurring for maximally entangled states.
Therefore, the C-parameter effectively provides a second ba-
sis that can be useful in a quantum communication context,
and will be called the "diagonal*" basis. The C-parameter is
used to monitor the quality of the quantum channel and any
significant drop from unity can be attributed to an eavesdrop-
per’s intervention[5]. C-parameter is a statistical value and it
can be shown to be constant even in the presence of a rela-
tive phase between the X and Y bases (for both qubits) for
a phase that can be approximated as being constant over the
finite measurement interval. For example, with the idealized
Bell state,
|Ψ〉= 1√
2
(|0〉A |1〉B+ eiφ |1〉A |0〉B) (3)
we get for 〈XAXB〉= cos(φ) and 〈YAXB〉= sin(φ). Propagat-
ing into Eq. 1, we get C =
√
cos(φ)2 + sin(φ)2 = 1, regard-
less of φ . For additional comments on the security also see
Laing et al. [5].
The channel integrity is monitored by observing the corre-
lation in both computational and "diagonal*" basis. The quan-
tum bit error ratios (QBER) in the computational basis and the
"diagonal*" basis are given by,
QBERHV =
1−〈Z⊗Z〉
2 ,
QBER∗Diag = 1−C2 . (4)
In the protocol, both the diagonal and the computational
basis are observed to estimate the QBER on the channel, as
required for extracting a secure key. The QBER∗Diag is an ef-
fective QBER which monitors any drop in the C-value. For
a more in-depth analysis of the QBER for RFI protocols, we
refer the reader to Yoon et al.[11]. From the estimated QBER
an asymptotic key rate is estimated via[12],
R≥ Qλ (1− fH2(QBERHV )−H2(QBER∗Diag)) (5)
where Qλ is the basis reconciliation factor, (1/6 in our case),
and f is the bidirection error correction efficiency[13, 14],
f = 1 as we assume error correction at the Shannon limit. It is
important to note that the analytical key rate of Eq. 5 does not
account for any mismatch in detection efficiencies nor the vac-
uum or multi photon contributions. We take a more in depth
look at this key rate estimation using numerical methods later
in Sec. III.
II. EXPERIMENT
The entangled photons used in the experiment are created
using a Sagnac interferometer [15] that bidirectionally pumps
a periodically poled potassium-titanyl phosphate non-linear
crystal that produces type-II spontaneous parametric down
conversion with the signal at 776 nm and the idler at 840 nm.
Details of the entire experimental setup can be found in Fig 1.
The down converted photons are then collected into PMF with
the horizontal and vertical polarizations aligned to the two
principle axes (slow and fast axis) of the PMF. Thus, the hori-
zontal and vertical polarizations are preserved while any other
polarization incident on the fiber will have a random rotational
phase due to the difference in index of refraction between the
slow and fast axis. The difference in group velocity between
the slow and fast component of the polarization will cause
temporal displacement, or walk-off.
The entangled photons each travel through 2 m of 780 nm
PM fibers. The lengths of the fibers are critical since the walk-
off induced to Alice’s photons should be the same as Bob’s
photon. In addition, the walk-off must be less than the pump’s
coherence time to avoid any distinguishability of the photon
pairs, since the coherence time of the entangled photons is
transfered from the pump [16, 17]. For our experiment the
fibers induce a walk-off of approximately 2.34 ps and the co-
herence time of the 405± 0.005 nm pump is approximately
1.08 ns. The coherence of the pump was closely monitored
with a spectrometer, see Fig 1. The pump laser would fre-
quently jump from single-frequency mode to multi-frequency
mode operation. It was observed that this reduced the quality
of the entangled source and thus the pump spectra was moni-
tored in order to perform our protocol with PMF.
The fibers are rotated by 90◦ relative to one another since
the type-II spontaneous parametric down conversion gener-
ated photon pairs with anticorrelated in polarization, to ensure
the two photons experience similar walk-offs. The resulting
entangled qubit state (ignoring the vacuum component) at the
output of the PMF can be approximated to Eq. 3 with φ be-
ing the phase accumulated from the relative phase between
the slow and fast axis of the PMF, Alice and Bob’s optical
elements and the phase of the pump laser, and |0(1)〉 is a hor-
izontally (vertically) polarized photon.
After traversing through the PMF the signal is measured by
Bob using a free-space 4 state polarization analyzer while the
idler is measured by Alice using a free-space 6 state polariza-
tion analyzer. All single photon and coincidence counts are
measured and recorded using silicon avalanche photodiodes,
with detector resolution of 500 ps and a time tagging unit. The
coincidences are measured using a 1 ns correlations window
and accumulated over a 1 s integration time. It is important
to select a correlation window that is larger than the detec-
tor resolution as the temporal uncertainty of a photon’s arrival
is limited by the detector timing jitter. In addition, care was
taken to ensure that the optical path efficiency of both state
analyzers are similar. However, the detection efficiencies may
vary between all the detectors and should be noted as this is a
crucial part of our security analysis to follow.
3FIG. 1: Experimental setup. A 405 nm laser pumps a type-II periodically poled potassium-titanyl phosphate (PPKTP)
non-linear crystal in a Sagnac interferometer[15]. Entangled 776 nm and 840 nm photons are collected into 780 nm polarization
maintaining fibers that induce a relative phase between the X and Y bases. Alice performs a complete six state measurement on
the 840 nm photon, while Bob performs a tomographically incomplete four state measurement on the 776 nm photon. Ten
silicon avalanche photodiodes are used to detect the photons. Coincidence and single events are recorded and analyzed by a
time-tagging unit and a computer. A spectrometer is used to monitor the pump spectra during the measurements. * indicates the
half-wave plate rotated about its vertical axis which is used to manipulate the external the phase allowing for rapid phase
variations.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
We present the results of two experimental conditions: the
first scenario (trial (a)) is where the system was left undis-
turbed such that the rotational phase is only due to drifts in
the birefringence of the PMF. In this configuration, any phase
changes can be attributed to stress of the fiber, whether it be
thermal or physically induced. The second scenario (trial (b))
phase changes where introduced using an additional birefrin-
gent element[18].
From the measurements we compute the expectation values
of all the possible POVM’s using Eq. 2 and calculate the C-
parameter. Indeed for trial (a), theC-parameter appears to be a
constant function of the phase, see Fig. 2 (a), as expected from
the definition of C, Eq. 1. However, in Fig. 2 (b) we see some
variation ofC, which can be attributed to a rapid change in the
relative phase. This drop in C-parameter is also correlated to
a drop in the inferred state purity.
A. QBER and Key Rate Estimates
From the correlation data, the QBER is estimated according
to Eq. 4. Note that even with the presence of a random rela-
tive phase induced by the fiber and the birefringent element, a
low overall QBER is maintained. We calculated the average
total QBER of 0.021(6) for trial (a) and 0.03(1) for trial (b).
A total QBER of less than 0.11 is required to perform a secure
key transfer for systems based on qubits. Our observed QBER
are well below this threshold which indicates this protocol is
robust to phase drifts despite the lack of complete measure-
ments.
Given the low overall QBER, an asymptotic normalized key
rate (per coincidence) is estimated for both trials using Eq. 5,
the results are shown in Fig. 2. The drop in key rate in trial (b)
is correlated to the spike in QBER that is exhibited during a
rapid phase change, up to approximately 0.7 rad/s. The aver-
age key rate value for trial (a) is 0.139(6) and 0.13(1) for trial
(b), while the theoretical limit of the key rate per coincidence
of our system, given by Eq. 5, is 0.167.
The analytical estimated key rate given from Eq. 5 only pro-
vides an estimation for the final key rate as it does not account
for detection efficiency mismatches. To further underline the
security of the protocol, we take a closer look at the key rate
by taking into account the effects of the different detection ef-
ficiencies in the various detection paths on both Alice’s and
Bob’s side. In this scenario, we cannot make a fair sampling
assumption. We implement a detailed modeling of the phys-
ical set-up, and perform a numerical security analysis along
4(a) System left undisturbed. Top: the experimental expectation
values and phase φ . The average C-parameter value is
C = 0.97(1) . Middle: Purity and concurrence of the entangled
state after the transmission through the PM fibers. Bottom:
QBER and key rate. The average QBER∗Diag is 0.0112(4) and
total QBER is 0.021(6). The average estimated key is 0.139(6).
The key rate is the normalized key rate (per coincidence) from
Eq. 5.
(b) Varying phase induced by a HWP in Alice’s analyzer. Top:
the experimental expectation values and phase φ . The average
C-parameter value is C = 0.96(4). Middle: Purity and
concurrence of the entangled state after the transmission
through the PM fibers. Bottom: QBER and key rate during the
phase change. The average QBER∗Diag is 0.022(2) and total
QBER is 0.03(1). The average estimated key rate is 0.13(1).
The key rate is the normalized key rate (per coincidence) from
Eq. 5.
FIG. 2: Experimental results, the shaded regions represent the calculated error in the respective value. Error bounds are present
in the top and bottom figures, however, some might be too small to be visible. The error bounds are derived using error
propagation of the statistical counting error. No error analysis is provided for the tomographically derived values (purity,
concurrence). The key rates in this figure are calculated using the raw coincidence data to compute the various expectation
values, (Eq. 2), propagated to compute the QBER, (Eq. 4), which is then used in Eq. 5 to produce the key rates shown above.
the lines of Winick et al. [19].
To accomplish this, we follow three steps. In the first step,
we analyze the data to find self-consistent values of the detec-
tion efficiencies for the various polarization detection paths.
In the second step, we deal with the fact that the experi-
ments provides frequencies of observed events. However,
our asymptotic key rate calculation requires probabilities of
events. Usually, a rigorous finite size security analysis would
work with frequencies, but this is beyond the scope of the
current analysis. Instead, we utilize a maximum likelihood
approach to convert frequencies to probabilities. In the third
step, using the determined detection efficiencies and observa-
tion probabilities derived from the quantum state estimation
procedure, we perform an asymptotic numerical security anal-
ysis.
In our calculations, we assume that the signals in each arm
are restricted to vacuum and single photon states in polariza-
tion. To facilitate the second step, we impose a time interval
structure onto our data to catch the effect of vacuum detec-
tions which are extremely predominant due to the enormous
amount of clock slots and accordingly shrinks the key rate.
Effectively, we assume that the experimental set-up runs on a
clock given by time scale of the coincidence detection elec-
tronics (1 ns). The effective clock allows us to account for
non-detection events properly.
For the first step, we fit the experimental data with a quan-
5tum optical model of source and detection, with detection
efficiencies as parameter. In this model, we introduce a re-
striction to vacuum and single photon signals. We verify the
self-consistency of this model, use the combined data from
all experimental runs and find, for the detection efficiency, fit
parameters listed in Table. II. Note that we do not provide an
error analysis, as the resulting key rate is only meant as indi-
cator, not as a complete finite size security analysis. Note also
that in a proper security analysis, one would have to determine
the detection efficiencies in independent calibration measure-
ments that cannot be influenced by the adversary Eve.
For the second step, we use a maximum likelihood method
(MLM)[20–22] to reconstruct the joint, two-party density ma-
trix in the respective vacuum and single-photon subspaces in
each arm, for the data of each run of the experiment. From the
reconstructed density matrix, we use a model of the POVM
elements (including the efficiency parameters derived in step
1) to extract probabilities for the observed events. Our selec-
tion of the MLM is not restrictive since we are only interested
in calculating the density matrix from the experimental data to
extract probabilities for the observed events, a task that would
usually be taken care of by a full finite size security analysis.
The MLM step serves only as a place holder to enable the cal-
culation of asymptotic key rates extrapolated from observed
frequencies of events. Therefore, one could also have chosen
other tomography methods.
In the third step, we find the asymptotic key rates of the set-
up under the model assumptions, following the numerical pro-
cedures that are described in detail in Winick et al.[19], which
performs a convex optimization procedure over all eavesdrop-
ping strategies that are compatible with the observations. We
show the resulting key rates for different 20 runs in Figure 3,
from which we can see the range of asymptotic key rates that
we can expect from the set-up. For the key rate calculation we
assume error correction at the Shannon limit.
The results of this detailed analysis, shown in Fig. 3, yield
comparable results to that of Eq. 5. Both the more detailed nu-
merical analysis and Eq. 5 yield on the order of 2000 bits/s,
the former yielding on average 1750 bits/s (circles in Fig. 3)
and the latter yielding approximately 2400 bits/s (triangles in
Fig. 3) for the same data. In addition, we perform the follow-
ing steps to better compare Eq. 5 with our numerical approach.
First we take the two-party density matrix that is computed
using the MLM and remove the vacuum components to form
a two-qubit density matrix. From this two-qubit density ma-
trix, we compute the probabilities for the various experimen-
tal events, using our model POVM elements and calculate the
QBER as per Eq. 4. From the QBER, we use Eq. 5 to obtain a
key rate (square in Fig. 3). In Fig. 3 we see that this method is
consistently producing higher key rates (2110 bits/s) than our
numerical analysis. Thus, we emphasize that both methods
utilize different subsets of the observed data in addition to the
different proof assumptions, but the analytical key rate (Eq. 5)
with its assumptions overestimates the key rate in this situa-
tion. Nonetheless, the numerical analysis which provides the
secure key rate determined through a physical model permits
us to further underline the security of the 6-4 scheme.
B. State Tomography
From the reconstructed density matrices of the MLM, we
discard the vacuum component of each matrix and compute
a renormalized two-qubit density matrix. With the new two-
qubit density matrices we calculate the quality of the entan-
gled state as a function of time and phase. We quantify
the quality of the entanglement using various entanglement
measures; purity, fidelity[23] compared to a maximally en-
tangled state of Eq. 3, concurrence[24] and entanglement of
formation[24], (Fig. 2, presents the purity and concurrence
as a function of time for both trial (a) and (b)). The calcu-
lated mean purity for the experimental data is 0.96(1) and
0.94(2) for trials (a) and (b) respectively, while the mean over-
lap fidelity with an ideal Bell state of each trial 0.987(3) and
0.980(4) . The fidelities are calculated by comparing the to-
mographically reconstructed state to Eq. 3, where φ is deter-
mined from the experimental data and as seen in Fig. 2 (top).
The average concurrence is 0.96(1) and 0.94(2), for trial (a)
and (b) respectively, while the average values for entangle-
ment of formation are 0.96(1) and 0.92(3) . As expected,
the interesting observation is that the quality of the measured
entangled state is relatively stable throughout the phase drift,
with the exception during times of rapid phase changes and
periods of higher photon loss. Thus, the phase change and ef-
fects of the birefringence from the PM fibers have little effect
on the quality of the entangled state, therefore enabling the
use of the PM fibers in quantum information experiments.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We demonstrate the feasibility of a novel 6-4 QKD pro-
tocol based on entangled photons. Despite the loss of one
measurement basis in the receiver, a secret key can be trans-
fered between two parties. The security of the protocol is un-
derlined by performing a numerical analysis of the secret key
rate. In addition we have shown that the protocol is reference
frame independent and resistant to a relative rotational phase
between two of the bases. Furthermore, we demonstrated
that polarization entangled photons can be reliably transfered
through high birefringence fibers such as polarization main-
taining fibers while maintaining a relatively high purity, con-
currence and entanglement of formation values. Thus, en-
abling the use of PM fibers in quantum information experi-
ments. The methods presented are also applicable to enhance
many other applications such as polarization compensation
systems, quantum LIDAR and metrology. Furthermore, this
protocol is applicable to prepare-measure QKD implementa-
tions with decoy states, and the additional configuration flex-
ibility for either the sender or the receiver to perform the 6
state operation.
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